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1 Introduction
Testing has become an integral part of innovation, pro-
duction and operation of systems. The activity of test-
ing is already a flourishing area with the active partici-
pation of a large community of researchers and experts
who are highly aware of its importance and impact for
the future deployment and use of software and systems.
Formal methods have proved to be very promising for
developing automated and generic testing methods. Ac-
tually, the combination of formal methods and testing
is currently well understood and tools to automate test-
ing activities are widely available.
(Formal) testing is the assessment, by means of ex-
periments, that a product conforms to its (formal) re-
quirements. Test cases are designed to test particular
aspects of the system, called test objectives. In order to
formally obtain testing objectives, it is necessary to pro-
vide mathematical models for the semantic of the stud-
ied system, formal frameworks for testing, languages to
describe the expected properties or requirements of the
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system in a precise and unambiguous way and meth-
ods to generate the expected test cases. In addition,
active methods require deploying a test environment
(test architecture) to execute test cases and to observe
implementation reactions. They may also interrupt the
system normal functioning arbitrarily, for example by
resetting it after each test case execution. However,
when a system is deployed in an integrated environ-
ment, it becomes quite difficult to access it. Moreover,
active methods may disturb the natural operation of the
implementation under test. So, these ones may not be
suitable in regards to the tested system. Passive testing
represents another interesting alternative, which offers
several advantages, for example, to not disturb the sys-
tem while testing.
In this paper we present a survey covering the main
approaches to formal testing. We have divided the sur-
vey in three parts. First, we distinguish between ac-
tive and passive approaches to formal testing. Next, we
review some of the work on testing the cloud and on
testing in the cloud.
2 Active testing
Most networked systems, especially communication pro-
tocols, are reactive systems. For each user input or
packet from another network component, a target sys-
tem provides the corresponding reactions and waits a
new input/packet. Thus, the specifications of such re-
active systems are often modeled as the finite state
machines (FSMs). In general, since communication is
essentially unreliable, many specifications of such net-
worked systems contain several exception handling and
timeout mechanisms. Therefore, the total number of
states of such a FSM based specification becomes rather
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large. In order to design and develop high reliable net-
worked systems, we need to guarantee the reliability of
developed implementations of such networked systems.
However, it is rather difficult to mechanically reproduce
the situations corresponding to all exception handling
and timeout mechanisms in real environment and test
whether the corresponding reactions for all the inputs
are carried out correctly. Therefore, a lot of methods for
conformance testing of communication protocols mod-
eled as FSMs have been developed, especially in 1980s
and 1990s (for survey, see [21,40,45,69]). Those testing
methods for FSMs are classified as active testing. In
active testing, a tester provides inputs/packets to each
targeted implementation (“Implementation Under Test
(IUT)”), and checks whether the corresponding outputs
from the IUT are the expected ones.
There are two types of methods in active testing:
functional (black-box) testing and structural (white-
box) testing. In black-box testing, each implementa-
tion is considered as a black-box where for given re-
quirements of a system (specification), test cases from
the requirements are derived to check the correctness
of their implementation. On the other hand, in white-
box testing, test cases are derived from the program of
a given implementation using each testing criteria. Ex-
amples of testing criteria are (i)all paths are executed in
the program, (ii)all conditions in the program are cor-
rectly branched, (iii)all uses of variables are correctly
implemented, and so on.
Conformance testing is a black-box testing approach
where a fault model is given. The most popular fault
model is that the targeted IUT is assumed to be mod-
eled as a FSM with the same number of states of a given
FSM based specification. The number of the states of a
given IUT might be larger than that of the FSM based
specification. Under such an assumption, for a given
pair of a formal specification Spec (requirements) of
a system and its black-box implementation Imp, we
derive test cases from Spec to determine if Imp con-
forms to Spec where the word “conform” has many
definitions depending on its formal models. Examples
of conformance relations are “equivalence” and “reduc-
tion relations”. The “equivalence” conformance relation
means that two FSMs are equivalent if they produce
the same output sequences for every possible input se-
quence from their initial states. In FSM based testing,
we usually consider the output and transfer faults. The
output fault means that a given IUT generates a dif-
ferent output from its specification while the transfer
fault means that a given IUT reaches a state generat-
ing a different output sequence from its specification.
For FSM based conformance testing, there are a lot
of testing methods such as W [18], Wp [25], DS [28],
UIO [67], UIOv [80], HSI [62] and H [20] methods. In W
and Wp methods, a characterization set W is derived
where any two different states of a reduced FSM are
distinguished by at least one sequence in the set W.
DS method corresponds to a special case of W method
where one distinguishing sequence (DS) distinguishes
all states of a given FSM. Note that the distinguishing
sequence does not always exist for any reduced FSM. In
UIO and UIOv methods, for each state of a given FSM,
a single sequence called UIO sequence can be used for
distinguishing the state from all other states. The UIO
sequence does not always exist for any state of a reduced
FSM. HSI and H methods are extensions of W and Wp
methods where unreduced FSMs are treated.
In general, networked systems are often updated.
Thus, their specifications might often be changed. In
such a case, depending on the change of a given speci-
fication, the corresponding IUT also needs to be modi-
fied. Even if the original IUT is confirmed to the orig-
inal specification, the modified IUT might not confirm
to the changed specification. Since it takes much time
for each conformance testing when the specification is
complicated, we need some devices for efficient confor-
mance testing. For this purpose, incremental testing
methods have been studied where incremental test cases
are generated to check that the modified parts of the
specification are correctly implemented in the modified
IUT. As the types of modifications of specifications, (i)
modification of outputs of transitions, (ii) modification
of ending states of transitions, (iii) addition/deletion
of transitions and (iv) addition/deletion of states are
considered. In [23], the authors show that incremental
testing methods are more efficient than complete con-
formance testing methods if the modified part is less
than 20 % of the whole specification.
From the late 1990s, high-speed networks and mul-
timedia communication systems have become popular.
Also, from the early 2000s, wireless communication net-
works are widely used. In those network systems, we
need to consider contents of data and their real-time
constraints. In order to treat such aspects, extended
FSM (EFSM) based conformance testing methods have
been proposed [22,33,47,81]. EFSM based conformance
testing uses mathematical techniques such as “unfold-
ing”, “abstraction” and “separation”. Unfolding trans-
forms a given EFSM into an equivalent FSM where
the values of variables are mapped into the control
states. Abstraction transforms a given EFSM into a
FSM where each “if then else” statement is abstractly
transformed into simple two branches. Separation con-
siders control flows and data flows of a given EFSM
separately where FSM based testing methods are ap-
plied for the control flows and software testing methods
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are used for testing the data flows. Some EFSM based
methods restrict a class of transition conditions and
variables. For example, in [33,47] the authors restrict
the transition conditions and operations of variables to
addition, subtraction and linear inequalities (+,−,=, <
,>) on integers, and apply integer linear programming
(ILP) techniques for finding satisfiable values in a given
test sequence with variables.
Recent high-speed networks and multimedia com-
munication systems have several types of timing con-
straints. In order to test such real-time systems, the
authors of [2] have proposed the timed automata model
where the predicates with multiple clock variables and
parameters can be specified as transition conditions of
an automaton. In general, such a predicate is repre-
sented as a logical formula of linear inequalities. In
[72], the authors have proposed testing methods for
the timed automata. In [24], the authors introduce a
timed I/O automaton (TIOA) model and consider tim-
ing faults, transfer faults and output faults. They clas-
sify a given TIOA into the control part and clock part,
transform them into the corresponding non-deterministic
FSM, and apply the characterization set for the control
part. Since the exact timing of the clock part at which
the IUT responds with outputs remains unknown, such
uncertainty is modeled as a non-deterministic FSM. In
[34], the authors propose a similar timed I/O automa-
ton model with data values. In order to trace a test
sequence (I/O sequence) on the timed I/O automaton,
we need to execute all I/O actions in the test sequence
at adequate execution timing which satisfy all timing
constraints in the test sequence. However, since outputs
are given from IUTs and uncontrollable, we cannot des-
ignate their output timing in advance. Also their output
timing affects the executable timing for the succeeding
I/O actions in the test sequence. The authors of [34]
propose a method for generating an executable timing
of each input action in a test sequence independently
of its preceding output actions’ timing.
In multimedia communication systems, QoS func-
tional testing is also important [66,73,78]. The subjects
of those QoS functional testing methods are to check
(i) play-back quality of each media object (frame rate
fluctuation, etc.), (ii) temporal relationship among ob-
jects (lip synchronization, etc.), and (iii) timeliness (de-
lay, play-back speed, etc.). The test procedure of QoS
functional testing is to (i) transmit packets to the IUT
at various timing and observe outputs from the IUT
for a long time interval, (ii) measure the frame rate
(time lag between two media objects) every short in-
terval (e.g., 1sec. ), (iii) register the measured value as
a sampling to get a statistical distribution of the values,
and (iv) determine those testing results statistically. In
QoS functional testing, for a specified probability P ,
we treat that a given IUT is correct when the execu-
tion sequences satisfy the constraints specified in the
specification at a probability P ′ such that P ′ ≥ P .
Recently, WiFi is becoming very popular. In WiFi,
a base station controls several mobile terminals. Such a
system is similar to client-server systems. Thus, testing
methods for client-server systems can be used for WiFi
based systems. On the other hand, ad hoc networks
(including MANET and VANET) and sensor networks
consist of several mobile terminals, and there are no in-
frastructure nor control nodes. Therefore, we need new
testing methods for ad hoc networks [16,35,49]. On the
other hand, the performance and reliability of multi-
hop communications strongly depends on node den-
sity distributions. Thus, for interoperability testing and
end-to-end performance testing, mainly passive testing
methods can be used. This is discussed in the next sec-
tion.
3 Passive testing
Since the early 1980s there has been an increasing in-
terest in passive testing, technically defined as a testing
activity in which a tester does not influence (stimulate)
an implementation under test in any way, it does not
apply any test stimuli. Rather, the usual approach of
passive testing consists on recording the trace (for in-
stance, the sequence of exchange of messages) produced
by the implementation under test and mapped to the
property to be tested or specification if it exists. Passive
testing helps to observe abnormal behavior in the im-
plementation under test on the basis of observing any
deviation from the predefined behavior. Moreover, it
is usually considered that the implementation is taken
without knowledge of its internal state that is to say
that we do not consider the event trace record to start
from the initial state or a predefined state. In general,
the specification has the form of a finite state machine
(FSM) and the work consists in verifying that the ex-
ecuted trace is accepted by the FSM specification. A
drawback of the first approaches is the low performance
of the proposed algorithms in terms of complexity and
especially if non deterministic specifications are consid-
ered.
New approaches have been proposed: a set of prop-
erties, called invariants, are extracted from the system
specification and checked on the traces observed from
the implementation to test their correctness. In this ap-
proach, information will be extracted from the specifi-
cation and then used to process the trace. New algo-
rithms are applied that check the properties on the real
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implementation traces. These algorithms are adapta-
tions of classical algorithms for pattern matching [76].
Another innovation proposed these last years is the
combination of passive testing and fault or attacks in-
jection techniques. Faults or attacks are be injected in
the code and passive testing techniques will be used to
analyse their impact.
One of the first works on passive testing has been
on its application to network fault management [44].
In this approach, the faults of a network protocol are
detected by passively observing its input/output be-
haviours without interrupting the normal network oper-
ations. The authors introduce methods for passive fault
detection in deterministic and non-deterministic FSMs.
The proposed technique is applied to a signaling net-
work protocol operating under Signaling System 7 and
report on experimental results, which show the feasi-
bility of applying passive testing to practical systems.
This work had a strong impact in other works on the
application of passive testing based on FSMs [83,86,77]
and EFSMs [74,42,1,43,76,10] and to systems speci-
fied as communicating FSMs (CFSM) [53–55]. In par-
ticular, in [86] the authors have proposed an approach
that provides information about possible starting states
and possible trace compatibility with the observed I/O
behavior at the end of passive fault detection. In addi-
tion, the proposed approach utilizes a Hybrid method to
evaluate constraints in predicates associated with tran-
sitions in an EFSM which combines the use of both
Interval Refinement and Simplex methods for perfor-
mance improvement during passive fault detection
Many passive testing techniques consider only the
control part of the system and neglect data, or are con-
fronted with an overwhelming amount of data values to
process. Passive testing using EFSM, mainly concen-
trates on checking the correctness of event sequences
(appearing in the collected trace), but it must also con-
sider the variables and the parameter values. In [74], the
authors have proposed the first passive testing method
based on deducing the variable and parameter values
from an event trace with EFSM specifications. In this
approach, the algorithm suffers from an information
loss problem. To overcome this issue, a more efficient
passive testing approach for fault detection is proposed
in [42]. In this paper, the authors present two algo-
rithms by using an event-driven EFSM. First, an effec-
tive passive testing algorithm for EFSMs is proposed;
second, an algorithm based on variable determination
with the constraints on variables is presented. This al-
gorithm allows users to trace the values of variables as
well as the system state. One drawback of this approach
is that not all transfer errors can be detected. Based on
the works of [42], the authors of [1] developed a simi-
lar approach of passive testing but following the trace
in the backward direction. In this approach the partial
trace is processed backward to narrow down the pos-
sible specifications. The algorithm performs two steps.
It first follows a given trace backward, from the cur-
rent configuration to a set of starting ones, according
to the specification. The goal is to find the possible
starting configurations of the trace, which leads to the
current configuration. Then, it analyzes the past of this
set of starting configurations, also in a backward man-
ner, seeking for configurations in which the variables
are determined. When such configurations are reached,
a decision is taken on the validity of the studied paths
(traces are completed). Such an approach is usually ap-
plied as a complement to forward checking to detect
more errors. This new algorithm was applied to the Sim-
ple Connection Protocol (SCP) that allows connecting
two entities after a negotiation of the quality of service
required for the connection. In [10], the backward and
forward methods are combined for online passive test-
ing of web services. Here, the algorithm attempts to
find a set of candidates in the past of the trace, that
matches the observed event. Using those information,
passive fault-detection is carried out, using the forward
approach.
In [57], control and data parts are considered by in-
tegrating the concepts of symbolic execution and by im-
proving trace analysis by introducing trace slicing tech-
niques. Properties are described using Input Output
Symbolic Transition Systems (IOSTSs). These proper-
ties can be designed to test the functional conformance
of a protocol as well as security properties. In IOSTS,
the parameters and variable values are represented by
symbolic values (called fresh variables) instead of con-
crete ones. Enumeration of data values is therefore not
required. This allows to reduce the huge amount of data
values commonly applied in many passive testing ap-
proaches. Besides, in this work a parametric trace slic-
ing technique is used for trace analysis. Trace analysis
plays a very important part in passive testing. A para-
metric trace is defined as a trace containing events with
parameters that have been bound to a concrete data
value (i.e., valuation) and parametric trace slicing is
defined as a technique to slice (or cut) the real protocol
execution trace into various slices based on the valua-
tion. Each slice corresponds to a particular valuation.
These trace slices merged together constitutes the exe-
cution trace. We then apply the symbolic execution of
our properties on the trace slices to provide a test ver-
dict. The proposed symbolic passive testing approach
was implemented in a tool called TestSym-P and ap-
plied to two different protocols: Session Initiation Pro-
tocol (SIP) and Bluetooth Protocol. A more extended
A survey on formal active and passive testing with applications to the cloud 5
version of the approach is provided in the Journal ar-
ticle [59] to specify the protocol properties as well as
several kinds of attack patterns. This helps to detect
conformance as well as security anomalies. In [60] it is
presented an interesting online verification technique of
service choreographies , which takes into account com-
plex data constraints. However, they assume that the
IUT conforms to the model (which are based on Sym-
bolic Transition Graph with Assignments (STGA)) and
also they prove the scalability of their approach for a
maximum of 20,000 packets.
Some works propose the use of invariants for pas-
sive testing. In [6] the authors propose that invariants
be provided by the expert/tester. Therefore, the first
step consists in checking that invariants are in fact cor-
rect with respect to the specification. An algorithm to
check this correctness is provided. The complexity, in
the worst case, of the algorithm was linear with respect
to the number of transitions of the specification. Once
a set of (correct) invariants is available, the second step
consists in checking whether the trace produced by the
IUT matched the invariants. In order to do so, a sim-
ple adaptation of the classical algorithms for pattern
matching on strings was implemented. This work was
extended [8] to study a new type of invariants (obliga-
tion), to present a tool that implements the approach
and to give a complete case study on the Wireless Ap-
plication Protocol. It is worth pointing out that this
protocol represents a typical example where active test-
ing cannot be applied because, in general, there is no
direct access to the interfaces between the different lay-
ers. Thus, testers cannot control how internal commu-
nications are established.
However, most of the described invariant based test-
ing approaches are derived from the FSM formalism,
where only control parts are considered. Then, the au-
thors of [15] proposed a method to extract the con-
straint information separately from the involved tran-
sitions in addition to extraction of control sequences.
According to their approach the correct sequence must
be found and the constraints must hold true, other-
wise a fault is detected. In another work [6] proposes a
minor modification to the obligation invariant, to deal
with constant data parameters. This approach paved
the way for another work by the authors of [39] to ex-
tend the simple and obligation invariant to match the
EFSM formalism. In [8] the authors assume that the
current states of the observed trace are known. In [58]
these assumptions are not required. Moreover, points of
observation are set in a black-box framework that does
not allow any homing phase. Since no formal specifica-
tion of the implementation is provided, the extracted
traces are not related to any known states. Another
recent interesting work on invariants was proposed by
the authors in [41]. In this approach, the authors dis-
cuss the importance of testing for data relations and
constraints between exchanged messages and they also
show how they can be tested directly on traces using
logic programming.
Monitoring is based on passive testing, i.e. the ob-
servation of the system traces without interfering with
the system’s normal operation [8,3]. Monitoring is also
close to run time verification [46]. The goal of mon-
itoring is to obtain improved visibility of the studied
communicating or inter-operating systems. Many tech-
niques can be applied but they all suppose the defini-
tion of a monitoring architecture (including the selec-
tion of observations points to collect the traces) and the
description of the system security requirements using,
for instance, formal specification languages. Different
types of monitoring can be considered, in this paper we
consider the following ones: i) monitoring of network
communication between inter-operating systems (that
we will refer to as blackbox monitoring); and, ii) the
monitoring of application execution (that we will refer
to as white-box monitoring).
Different techniques for network monitoring exist
in the literature and can be based on, for instance,
SNMP [68,85], Deep Packet Inspection (DPI) [19] and
invariants [56]. DPI is a technique that is used for com-
pletely analyzing communication packets (both headers
and payloads) and can be useful for security analysis of
network traffic and detecting and preventing intrusions
(IDPS, Intrusion Detection and Prevention Systems)
[52]. Most techniques used depend on pattern marching
to detect intrusions or attacks (e.g. SNORT) [71] but
very few use correlation of events to generate alarms
(e.g. BRO) [11].
White-box monitoring is similar to run-time veri-
fication where the application is analysed during its
execution. Several techniques exist, including code in-
strumentation using: just-in-time compilation (e.g. Val-
grind) [79], debugging tools (e.g. GDB) [27], etc. [64]
proposes the use of aspect-oriented monitoring approaches
for validation and testing of a software against con-
straints specified on an associated UML design model.
Monitoring can be performed online and offline. In
the former, the passive tester tries to detect a fault
during the execution of the system [29,70], whereas,
in the latter, the evaluation of the system is done by
collecting the recorded traces [65,1,4,84].
Property modeling for monitoring have been defined
and adapted from currently used formalisms, some of
the works using trace analysis techniques: TIC [50] and
TIPS [56] are based on the analysis of, respectively the
execution traces of a system and the exchanged commu-
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nication packets. They aim at determining if real traces
of the system respect functional and security require-
ments.
Some research works have been dedicated to passive
testing of timed systems. In [5] it is presented a formal
passive testing methodology for timed systems. The pa-
per presents two algorithms to check the correctness of
proposed invariants with respect to a given specifica-
tion and algorithms to check the correctness of a log,
recorded from the implementation under test, with re-
spect to an invariant. The soundness of this method-
ology is shown by relating it to an implementation re-
lation. A tool, called PASTE, which implements the
proposed algorithms is also proposed.
An interesting work has been performed on the pas-
sive testing of asynchronous systems. The work pre-
sented in [30] is focused in the analysis, based on passive
testing, of the asynchronous communication between
the system and the tester taking into account the dif-
ferent observations that can be expected due to the as-
sumption of asynchrony. The proposed technique checks
properties against traces in polynomial time, with a low
need for storage. This technique is well adapted to real-
time systems.
Different tools have been proposed to automate all
the phases of the passive testing approach. In partic-
ular, these tools include the algorithms to check the
correctness of invariants with respect to the specifica-
tion and to decide whether the trace observed from the
implementation respects the invariants. MMT is a mon-
itoring tool developed by MI [82]. This tool allows cap-
turing and analysing network traffic and application
traces. It can be used to verify functional properties,
QoS and security properties and is composed of MMT-
Capture probes and a MMT-Operator application that
allow deploying a mixed distributed/centralized net-
work monitoring solution.
4 Testing (in) the cloud
In this short section we consider some of the work on
testing (in) the cloud. Although the special issue tar-
geted the broad scope of testing distributed and net-
worked systems, where formal testing is well established [48,
36,13,63,75,31,32], cloud computing represents the nat-
ural evolution of these systems and work on testing is
in their initial stages. First, we would like to mention
the difference between two apparently similar concepts:
testing in the cloud and testing the cloud. The former
one targets the validation of applications, environments
and infrastructures that are available on a cloud en-
vironment. This ensures the correct operation of each
part of the cloud system against the expectations of
the cloud computing business model. Cloud testing, or
Testing as a Service (in short, TaaS), involves using
cloud infrastructures in testing products and services.
In other words, cloud testing can be seen as a service
while testing a cloud is an inexorable activity that must
be undertaken for any application developed to be ex-
ecuted in a cloud system [51].
Although testing (in) the cloud is a flourishing ac-
tivity, there is almost no work on formal testing. First,
this special issue includes a paper by Alberto Nu´n˜ez
and Robert M. Hierons where the authors present a
formal methodology for validating cloud models using
metamorphic testing. Another paper dealing with for-
mal testing of cloud systems presents a formalism where
a computing cloud is modelled as a graph, computing
resources, such as services and intellectual property ac-
cess rights, are attributes of a graph node, and the use
of a resource is modelled as a predicate on an edge of
the graph [17]. Cloud computations are modelled as a
set of paths in a subgraph of the cloud such that every
edge contains a predicate that must hold to enable the
edge. This formalism also includes a family of model-
based testing criteria to support the testing of cloud
applications.
Next we review some work on testing cloud systems
although they do not consider formal methods. One ap-
proach for testing cloud systems executes a real virtual
machine instead of a model that mimics its underly-
ing behaviour. D-Cloud [7] is a software testing envi-
ronment that manages virtual machines and includes
fault injection capabilities. Basically, D-Cloud sets up
a test environment on cloud resources using a given sys-
tem configuration file and automatically executes sev-
eral tests according to a given scenario. D-Cloud has
been built on top of Eucalyptus and uses QEMU [9] to
build virtual machines that simulate faults in parts of
the hardware including disk, network and memory. Pre-
Fail [37] is a programmable and efficient failure testing
framework where testers can express a variety of fail-
ure exploration policies, skip redundant fault-injection
tests, run failure testing in parallel, and reduce the time
to debug failed test runs. Unlike D-Cloud, that provides
simulated actual faults, PreFail inserts a failure surface
between the target system and the OS library.
In recent years, simulation has become a widely
adopted loosely formalised approach for testing cloud
systems. The developer builds a simulation model that
imitates the behaviour of the target system and then
different measures, like performance and power con-
sumption, are gathered by running simulations. Researchers
have designed cloud models and then performed ad-
hoc testing by manually simulating different scenarios
and comparing obtained results. Among the available
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simulation tools that can be used to model and simu-
late cloud computing environments are CloudSim [12],
GreenCloud [38], SimGrid [14], Virtual-GEMS [26] and
iCanCloud [61].
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